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Verbakel, C.M.C.

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Ellen Verbakel

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Ellen Verbakel¹

Abstract

We study to what extent adjustments in labor market participation, defined as employment entry and exit, and as increases and reductions of weekly working hours, depend on resources of the partner. Moreover, we investigate whether the influence of the partner depends on historical period, human capital, and children. We are especially interested in the economic-based hypothesis that people are more likely to reduce working hours when their partners have more resources. We use retrospective information on labor market careers of 5,685 respondents and their (ex-)partners (Family Surveys of the Dutch Population 1998–2003). Our results provide little support for the economic hypothesis, and we suggest that family formation and cultural factors are more important predictors for male and female labor market participation adjustments in the Netherlands.

Keywords

working hours, labor market career, couples, event-history analysis

¹Tilburg University, Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Ellen Verbakel, Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153,
5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

Email: E.Verbakel@uvt.nl

Introduction

A partner who is successful in the labor market is advantageous for an individual's financial well-being because of the partner's positive contribution to the household income but might, at the same time, be disadvantageous for individual labor market outcomes, as a result of financial disincentives. This is the essence of the economic hypothesis based on the argument that couples divide labor with efficiency in mind. Households need time and money to function, and because decisions on labor market participation have strong consequences for the availability of time and income in the household, it is indeed plausible that labor market characteristics of both partners contribute to decisions on each spouse's labor market participation (Bernasco 1994; Blossfeld & Drobnic, 2001). New home economists argue that to maximize household productivity, the spouse with the highest earning capacities specializes in paid work and that the other partner specializes in unpaid work (Becker, 1981). This hypothesis has been translated into the more general prediction that the incentive to work long hours is weaker for someone who has a successful partner; also, someone whose partner has a successful career can afford not to work or to work fewer hours (Bernasco, de Graaf, & Ultee 1998; Hendrickx, Bernasco, & de Graaf, 2001; Sorensen, 1983).

Earlier research showed mixed and weak support for the economic mechanism behind a couple's labor division. There is some support for a restrictive influence of husbands' human capital on female labor market participation, which is in concordance with the economic hypothesis (Bernardi, 1999; Bernasco, 1994; Davies, Elias, & Penn, 1994; Sorensen, 1983), but it is sometimes only found in couples with children (Hendrickx et al., 2001; Lundberg, 1988). However, it has also been concluded that wives' labor market resources (education and income) do not affect husbands' labor market entry or exit (Bernasco, 1994), whereas others concluded that wives' education is a resource instead of a disincentive for husbands' probabilities to find a job (Brynin & Francesconi, 2004). This challenges the economic hypothesis.

In this study, we set out to evaluate the economic hypothesis in the Dutch context and aim to sort out the inconclusiveness of earlier findings. We expect this inconclusiveness about the effect of spouse's resources on labor market participation to be due to a lack of specification. First, we believe the historical context needs to be considered. Much research has shown that during the past decades, attitudes toward working women and mothers have become less traditional (Treas & Widmer, 2000). The traditional male breadwinner model is increasingly replaced by other arrangements, a trend also seen in the Netherlands (Van Gils & Kraaykamp, 2008). Because female labor

is considered to be both desirable and necessary from both women's and men's points of view (Oppenheimer, 1977), the negative incentive of husbands' resources on wives' working hours may have become weaker, whereas the modern view of equal division of labor might have increased the impact of wives' resources on husbands' working hours adjustments. If the way spouses influence each others' working hours has indeed been subject to change, results depend strongly on the observation window considered. The neglect of a historical perspective in earlier studies might therefore be an important reason for the discrepancies between the findings so far. A second condition that may affect the way in which the labor market resources of the spouse influence working hours adjustments is individual human capital. A successful husband might reduce the working hours of a poorly educated wife, whereas a successful husband is not enough reason for a highly educated wife to lower her working hours because this would harm her future career opportunities. The third condition we investigate is the presence of children in the household. We expect that the influence of the spouse's resources is stronger when there are young children in the household, because the presence of young children requires another balance of time and money in the household (van der Lippe, 2001).

Note that it is not likely that couples' decisions on working hours adjustments depend solely on economic factors but on cultural factors as well (Hakim, 2000; Van Wel & Knijn, 2006). The role specialization hypothesis, for instance, suggests that men are responsible for household income, especially if they have a family, and therefore work full-time. Women usually follow an employment pattern that corresponds with the traditional female role: Women work full-time until they marry or have children; then they are responsible for the caring tasks until the youngest child is old enough, and finally they often increase working hours again (Myrdal & Klein, 1956; Sorensen, 1983; van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994). Besides general norms in society, personal values may determine labor market participation decisions as well. Based on a panel study, Jansen and Kalmijn (2000) found that modern values with regard to young women's emancipation lead to more working hours for women in the Netherlands after the first child is born.

This study focuses especially on the economic hypothesis, and sets out to put it to a new test. We believe the right test is an analysis of the partner's human capital on the probability of entering or leaving the labor market, or increasing or reducing working hours in a time-dependent setup. We will extensively control for individual human capital and the family cycle, and we will consider several kinds of labor market participation adjustments: transitions into and out of employment (entry and exit) and changes in weekly

working hours (increase and reduction) of both men and women. Moreover, we will investigate three conditions under which the restrictive effect of spouses' resources is more likely to show up: historical period, the level of individual human capital, and the presence of children. For this purpose, we pooled three waves (repeated cross sections) from the Family Surveys of the Dutch Population (1998, 2000, and 2003), which include detailed retrospective information on the labor market careers of 5,685 respondents and their spouses. We address the following research questions: (a) To what extent are working hours adjustments determined by labor market resources of the partner? (b) Under which conditions, specified as historical period, individual human capital, and the presence of children, do partner's resources influence working hours adjustments?

We think that investigating the case of the Netherlands increases the chance of finding support for the economic hypothesis. The Netherlands, known as a part-time working country, has a very large variety in working hours, both for women and for men (Blossfeld & Hakim, 1997). In 2006, 40% of Dutch women between the ages of 15 and 65 were nonemployed and were not looking for a job. Of all employed women, one third worked full-time and two thirds had part-time jobs ranging from 12 to 34 hr a week (www.cbs.nl/statline). One of seven Dutch working men had a part-time job (mainly more than 20 hr a week) in 2006, which is high compared to other countries (Delsen, 1998). Part-time work is highly accepted in the Netherlands, and even strongly preferred because outsourcing child care for 5 days a week is largely considered as undesirable (Portegijs & Keuzenkamp, 2008). It is obvious that a cultural climate that allows individual choices is well suited to allow economic grounds to be decisive. In addition, compared with many other countries, the Netherlands is typical in the sense that a household usually does not need two full-time incomes to have a decent living, but that (one or) one and a half income is sufficient (Henkens, Grift, & Siegers, 2002; Plantenga, 1993). This feature stimulates specialization, and enables couples to decide to reduce working hours, at least of one of the partners.

Theory

The economic hypothesis that we will test can be summarized as follows. If one's spouse has a favorable position on the labor market, one has economic incentives to work less or to stop working completely and has no economic incentives to enter the labor market or to increase working hours (Bernasco, 1994; Hendrickx et al., 2001; Sorensen, 1983). We think that the restrictive

influence of spouse's resources on adjustments of labor market participation depends on several factors, and we will put forward three expectations in this respect.

First, we hypothesize that the role of the spouse in labor market participation decisions has changed over time. According to traditional values about the sexual division of work in marriage, married women should not work, or at least not work full-time, and women should make the decision to reduce working hours as soon as the household can afford it, that is, when the husband makes enough money. These traditional values coincide with the idea of restrictive partner effects, so we expect the restrictive partner effect to be particularly strong for women in earlier decades. Nowadays, the traditional norm about female labor market participation has weakened, so for women it has become less important whether a reduction in working hours can be realized. On top of that, because of emancipation processes, women want to work nowadays, regardless of their husbands' position (Bielby & Bielby, 1992; Sorensen, 1983). The cultural modernization process therefore predicts that for women, support for the economic hypothesis has weakened over time.

The same prediction can be derived on the basis of developments in social policy. The Dutch social welfare system had long been designed on the basis of a male breadwinner model, which discouraged female employment, but has shifted toward a system that is underpinned by the "adult-worker model" (Lewis, 2001). Its basic assumption is that all adults are employed and are self-sufficient, autonomous individuals. Women used to be discouraged, but they are now encouraged to work as the new welfare system especially harms people who reduce labor market activity. This policy change might have stimulated women not to let the husbands' resources be a reason for scaling back. As a result, the negative influence of the human capital of the partner has become weaker. In addition, the expansion of child care during the past decades (Portegijs, Cloin, Ooms, & Eggink, 2006) might have lowered the need for specialization between partners, again leading to the prediction that the economic hypothesis has lost explanatory power. In 3 years' time only (between 2001 and 2004), the supply of child care for 0- to 3-year-old children has increased by one third and for 4- to 12-year-old children by two thirds (Statistics Netherlands, www.cbs.nl/statline). In sum, we expect that for women, support for the economic hypothesis has become weaker over time. The existence of such a trend has been shown in Britain with respect to female labor market participation after the birth of the first child (Joshi & Hinde, 1993).

With respect to men, we expect that modernization of norms has led to the opposite result compared to women. In a traditional view, men are supposed to work full-time regardless of the household situation, leaving no room for

a wife's influence on the number of working hours. The modern view on the sexual division of work is that there should be more equality between husband and wife. This does not only imply a stimulation for women to work more but also a stimulation for men to work somewhat less to have time to care for children. Moreover, emphasis on a more equal division of labor between husband and wife has loosened the standard of a full-time job, which leaves room for reactions to incentives that come from the wife's labor market situation (Bielby & Bielby, 1992). Therefore, we predict that for men, support for the economic hypothesis has become stronger over time.

Second, we argue that the degree to which the resources of the partner impose work-related incentives depends on the human capital of the individual. We assume that men and women with higher levels of human capital make decisions more independently of their spouses' situation. Following the economic argument on the individual level, people with more human capital and corresponding earning capacity have stronger economic incentives to spend time on paid labor and have more to lose if they decide to work less or to stop working completely. That is why they are more inclined to let the impact of their own human capital prevail and act more independently from their spouses. High levels of human capital do not only make division of labor unattractive for individuals; new home economists reason that even for the household, division of labor becomes less beneficial if the earning capacities of the wife are high (Blossfeld & Huinink, 1991). These arguments lead us to expect that the economic hypothesis will be supported more strongly for people with little human capital than for people with a lot of human capital.

Third, we expect the presence of children to be a condition for restrictive partner effects. Childless couples do not experience strong time demands in the household. They will probably not prefer to lower their working hours at the cost of household income, and thus the economic hypothesis applies only weakly. Couples with children, however, value time more highly at the expense of income. In the Netherlands, couples dislike "outsourcing" their children for 5 days a week (Portegijs, Hermans, & Lalta, 2006), so the presence of young children induces a preference for fewer working hours. In such a situation, it becomes important whether one of the two spouses is successful enough to make it affordable for the other spouse to work less. In other words, when children are born, the economic incentives become more prevalent, and thus we argue that the economic hypothesis will find stronger support for couples with children than for couples without children. Hakim (2000) argued that women do not make a choice between work and family until they get married or have children. This might imply that the labor market situation of the husband has no influence before the couple has children, and becomes

of influence only when children are born. Indeed, Lundberg (1988) found a negative effect of the husband's income on his wife's labor market participation only if the couple had children, and Hendrickx et al. (2001) showed that the husband's income lowers his wife's likelihood to reenter the labor market if the couple have children.

Data

We compile the Family Surveys of the Dutch Population that were collected in 1998, 2000, and 2003 (de Graaf et al., 1998, 2000, 2003). These cross-sectional surveys cover the Dutch population between the ages of 18 and 70 with an overrepresentation of couples, and are representative with respect to region, sex, age, and education. The data are based on structured face-to-face interviews and self-completion questionnaires, which were identical for primary respondents and their cohabiting or marital partners (secondary respondents). The net response rate varies between 40.6% and 52.6%, which is normal for this kind of survey design in the Netherlands. In total, 5,764 respondents (primary respondents and their partners) have been interviewed. Our analyses will be based on a sample of 5,685 individuals who are 20 years or older at the time of the interview. A retrospective design has been used in which respondents were asked to reconstruct, with exact dates, their careers in several domains. This means that every change in any life domain and the times of these changes are recorded. As a result, the data contain complete labor market and demographic careers of the respondent and his or her partner until the time of the interview. Retrospective questions generally struggle with recalling issues. Several features of the data and data collection strengthen our confidence that the data produce reliable life histories. First, occupations, partners, and children are very salient issues in one's life, which increases the likelihood of accurate recall (van der Vaart, 1996). Second, respondents have reported about their own lives instead of on the lives of others (de Vries, 2006). Third, the modules with retrospective questions in the interview were preceded by a "career recollection tool" that helped the respondent to produce an overview of all the jobs he or she once held, in the correct order and complete with starting and ending dates and a brief description of the job.¹ On the basis of this retrospective information, we construct a person-month file. We start observing each respondent in the month after one finished school and end observing him or her at the moment of survey. For each month, the necessary information has been coded. We analyze working hours adjustments of all women and men in our data, regardless of whether they were primary or secondary respondents, and we

base the analysis on the months in which respondents were between 20 and 55 years of age.

Changes in Labor Market Participation

We are interested in four possible changes in labor market participation: employment entry, employment exit, increase of working hours, and reduction of working hours. We apply discrete-time event history analysis with repeated events to establish the effects of independent variables on the probability to experience each of these four events (Allison, 1982; Yamaguchi, 1991). Employment entry is defined as finding a job after a period of nonemployment, and we record the transition into employment in the month the respondent found a job. The risk set for the analysis on employment entry consists of all months in which respondents do not have a job. Employment exit is defined as exactly the opposite—a transition from an employment situation to a nonemployment situation—and the risk set consists of all months in which respondents have a job. Working hours represent actual working hours, and changes therein can be either within a job or between jobs, which are both recorded in our data. An increase of at least 8 hr a week is considered as a transition into more working hours. This means that we only regard at least one working day more a week as a substantial change in the total number of working hours for the household. We top-coded the number of working hours at 60 hr a week, so obviously, only in months that the respondent works 52 hr at the most is he or she at risk to increase working hours. Analogously, a reduction of 8 or more hours a week is regarded as a transition into fewer working hours, and respondents are only at risk in the months they work at least 9 hr a week. Note that respondents can experience a particular event more than once in our data. Descriptive information on the events is displayed in Table 1. The number of events ranges from 552 (males who increase working hours) through 1,842 (females who leave the labor force). Generally, women adjust their working hours more often than men.

Relationship Status, Partner's Labor Market Resources, and Control Variables

There are two general approaches to analyze the influence of independent variables on events. The first approach is based on the idea that the decision to change one's working hours is a response to another change in the couple's life. For example, the reduction of working hours of the wife may be the consequence of an increase in the husband's occupational status. In this approach, both the independent and the dependent variables are measured as

Table 1. Number of Events for Females and Males by the Extent to Which Their Labor Market Participation Changed

	Entry		Exit ^a			More hours		Fewer hours	
	Females	Males	Females	Males		Females	Males	Females	Males
1 day	126	8	46	3	8-15 hr	304	308	461	347
2 days	289	5	129	2	16-23 hr	172	197	345	166
3 days	287	24	252	16	24-31 hr	55	31	122	29
4 days	201	36	216	29	32-39 hr	22	11	42	13
5 days	298	589	979	483	≥40 hr	7	5	17	9
≥6 days	40	174	220	196					
Total	1,241	836	1,842	729	Total	560	552	987	564

Source: Family Survey of the Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003.
a. For three women and one man, it is not known how many days they worked before they left the labor market.

events. We did not choose this approach because we think that people do not react instantly to an event, and because it is difficult to determine or estimate how long the time lag between the events will be. To overcome this problem, we have chosen a second approach, that is, to model the independent variables as states (or situations). For example, we will estimate a model in which the occupational status of the husband is the independent variable and the reduction of working hours of the wife is the dependent variable.

We distinguish four categories of relationship status: singleness, noncohabiting relationship, unmarried cohabitation, and marriage. This time-dependent variable is based on the start and end date of the relationship between the respondent and his or her (ex-)partner and on the dates that they moved to another relational category, for example from a noncohabiting relationship to unmarried cohabitation. For former relationships, only cohabiting or married relationships could be distinguished.

Information on partner's labor market resources has been added in all months that the respondent had a relationship (noncohabiting, cohabiting, or married) with that specific partner. Our information on the respondent's partner at the moment of interview is complete; for ex-partners, educational attainment is known in the 1998 and 2000 surveys, and last occupation only in the 1998 survey. We consider four partner characteristics. Education has been measured in years of schooling, varying from 6 years for elementary education to 20 years for a postgraduate degree.² A dummy variable indicates whether the partner has a job (*employed* = 0 and *nonemployed* = 1). If the

spouse has a job, we measure his or her occupational status by the International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI). Finally, we include the number of working hours of the partner. Although wages might correspond more closely to the economic perspective, the reliability of this kind of information is believed to be limited in retrospective designs. As an alternative way to measure the impact of the partner's resources, we have constructed difference scores between the respondent's and the partner's educational level and ISEI. This approach shows to what extent it matters whether the partner is higher educated or has a higher occupational status than the respondent, which is more closely related to the ideas of new home economics. Results of this sensitivity analyses will be discussed; results reported in the models refer to the general way of measuring partner's resources. All partner variables are time dependent. Missing values on partner's educational level, occupational status, and number of working hours have been imputed with mean scores. For the partners for whom missing values are the result of the absence of a job, the dummy variable with a score of 1 for partner's joblessness takes account of the missing cases. For the partners for whom missing values indicate real missing information, dichotomous indicators have been included in the models (coded 1 for missing); the effects of these indicators are not shown in the tables.

We have a relatively large set of indicators of individual human capital to ascertain that effects of the spouse's labor market resources are not confounded with the effects of one's own human capital. Educational attainment has been measured in years of schooling (6-20 years). Occupational status has been measured by the ISEI (Ganzeboom, de Graaf, & Treiman, 1992). In the months that people are nonemployed (and thus at risk of experiencing employment entry), we used the occupational status of the last job (if any, otherwise we have a missing case). Work experience is the total number of months (transformed into years) that a person has been employed at a particular moment. During nonemployment spells, the amount of work experience remains unchanged, and continues to rise again in the month a new employment spell starts. We added a quadratic term of work experience as well, so that the duration effect is well covered. A dummy variable indicates whether people have any supervisory authority over other employees. In case of nonemployment, we again included the information on the last job. Finally, the number of weekly working hours ranges from 1 up to 60. Missing values on education, (last) occupational status, and working hours have been imputed with mean scores, and dummy variables (score 1 if initial value is missing) have been added to the models (but will not be reported in the tables); missing values on (last) supervisory authority have been captured in an extra category. All five human capital indicators are time

dependent except for education, because people start to be at risk after finishing education. Religiosity is included as a proxy for traditional values. If either the respondent or the partner (if any) is religious, we assume the couple to be religious.

The presence and age of children have been classified in four categories, and varies over the life course: no children, youngest child is under the age of 4, youngest child is 4 years or older and still living in the household, and children have left the parental home (empty nest). A fifth category comprises missing values. This information is based on the dates of birth of all children, the dates that each child has left the parental home (if there is missing information, we assume the child left home on age 18), and, in exceptional cases, the dates of children's death. We do know whether respondents have children from prior relationships, but we have no information on where they are living. These children are assumed to have left the home of the father after the divorce and to live in the household of widowed fathers and divorced or widowed mothers (until the age of 18).

In all models, we include controls for historical period, duration of being at risk, and number of earlier experienced events. Historical period is controlled for by means of five dummy variables: 1940-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-2003. To test whether the influence of partner's human capital has changed over time, we construct linear interaction terms between, for example, partner's education and year, in which year has been recoded to 0 for the first period, and to 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 4.7 for the four other periods. This implies that historical changes can be interpreted in decades. The duration of being at risk of experiencing employment entry, employment exit, or an increase or reduction in working hours, respectively, has been divided into five categories: less than 2 years, 2 to 4 years, 5 to 9 years, 10 years or more, and a category that comprises missing values. Because we model repeated events (e.g., a respondent can leave the labor market more than once), the likelihood of experiencing an event might be dependent on the prior event history (Allison, 1982). Therefore, we include a time-dependent variable that indicates how many times the respondent has experienced the event of employment entry, employment exit, increase in working hours, or reduction in working hours, respectively, before. We will not control for age because it correlates strongly with work experience, especially for men. In addition, we believe that the effects of the life course are captured sufficiently by the relationship status and the age of the children.

All independent variables, apart from historical period and duration, are lagged 1 month to ascertain that they represent the situation before the transition took place. The analysis will be done separately for men and women. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all independent variables for females and males.

Table 2. Statistics of Independent Variables for Females and Males, Based on the Sample of Months in Which They Are Aged Between 20 and 55 and the Respondent Is at Risk of Labor Market Entry and Exit, Respectively (Average of All Months Per Respondent)

	At risk for labor market entry					At risk for labor market exit				
	Female			Male		Female			Male	
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>SD</i>
Historical period										
1940-1959	1,890	0.02		1,113	0.07		2,519	0.05	2,542	0.03
1960-1969	1,890	0.08		1,113	0.08		2,519	0.09	2,542	0.07
1970-1979	1,890	0.17		1,113	0.14		2,519	0.13	2,542	0.14
1980-1989	1,890	0.28		1,113	0.32		2,519	0.22	2,542	0.24
1990-2003	1,890	0.47		1,113	0.40		2,519	0.52	2,542	0.52
Duration at risk										
<2 years	1,890	0.32		1,113	0.64		2,519	0.22	2,542	0.13
2-4 years	1,890	0.15		1,113	0.12		2,519	0.19	2,542	0.12
5-9 years	1,890	0.25		1,113	0.13		2,519	0.39	2,542	0.29
≥10 years	1,890	0.27		1,113	0.12		2,519	0.20	2,542	0.46
Missing value	1,890	0.00		1,113	0.01		2,519	0.01	2,542	0.01
No. of entry/exit duration										
events (0-4.5)	1,890	0.21	0.45	1,113	0.11	0.31	2,519	0.28	2,542	0.20
Human capital										
Education in years (6-20) ^a	1,879	11.11	3.07	1,110	12.05	3.28	2,510	11.80	2,533	12.09
										3.26

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

	At risk for labor market entry						At risk for labor market exit					
	Female			Male			Female			Male		
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Occupational status (10-88) ^{a,b}	1,539	45.56	14.31	678	42.45	14.37	2,503	47.05	14.04	2,530	48.06	14.10
Work experience (0-39) ^a	1,890	6.34	5.91	1,113	5.92	9.65	2,519	7.53	5.03	2,542	11.67	6.17
Work experience square (0-1,521) ^a	1,890	77.56	150.24	1,113	131.21	297.14	2,519	102.48	124.55	2,542	220.25	181.43
Supervising ^b	1,890	0.10		1,113	0.11		2,519	0.15		2,542	0.35	
Not supervising ^b	1,890	0.69		1,113	0.46		2,519	0.82		2,542	0.64	
Missing value supervising ^b	1,890	0.21		1,113	0.43		2,519	0.03		2,542	0.01	
Working hours (3-60) ^a							2,507	32.60	9.29	2,536	41.22	6.58
Religiosity												
Respondent and/or partner religious	1,890	0.59		1,113	0.53		2,519	0.57		2,542	0.55	
Respondent and/or partner not religious	1,890	0.37		1,113	0.43		2,519	0.39		2,542	0.41	
Missing value religiosity	1,890	0.04		1,113	0.04		2,519	0.04		2,542	0.03	

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

	At risk for labor market entry				At risk for labor market exit							
	Female			Male	Female			Male				
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>			
Children												
No children in household	1,890	0.25		1,113	0.69		2,519	0.66	2,542	0.51		
Youngest child < 4 years old	1,890	0.39		1,113	0.11		2,519	0.12	2,542	0.22		
Youngest child ≥ 4 years old	1,890	0.30		1,113	0.15		2,519	0.17	2,542	0.23		
Empty nest	1,890	0.06		1,113	0.06		2,519	0.04	2,542	0.04		
Missing value	1,890	0.00		1,113	0.00		2,519	0.00	2,542	0.00		
children												
Relationship status												
Single	1,890	0.10		1,112	0.30		2,517	0.15	2,542	0.15		
Noncohabiting relationship	1,890	0.05		1,112	0.25		2,517	0.22	2,542	0.14		
Unmarried cohabitation	1,890	0.08		1,112	0.10		2,517	0.15	2,542	0.12		
Marriage	1,890	0.76		1,112	0.35		2,517	0.48	2,542	0.58		
Partner's resources												
Partner's education (6-20) ^{a,c}	1,659	11.85	3.31	810	11.58	3.23	2,216	12.22	3.18	2,289	11.54	3.03
Partner job ^c	1,766	0.79		863	0.49		2,366	0.79		2,395	0.53	

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

	At risk for labor market entry				At risk for labor market exit				
	Female		Male		Female		Male		
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Partner no job ^c	1,766	0.13		863	0.44		2,366	0.13	
Missing value	1,766	0.07		863	0.08		2,366	0.08	
partner job ^c									
Partner's	1,490	48.14	14.92	535	47.37	15.47	2,033	48.46	14.68
occupational									
status (10-88) ^{a,d}									
Partner's working	1,449	41.64	7.18	523	34.14	10.14	2,000	41.24	6.73
hours (2-60) ^{a,d}									
No. of respondents		1,890			1,113			2,519	
No. of months		324,859			90,267			381,022	
No. of events		1,241			836			1,845	

Source: Family Survey of the Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003.

a. Only for nonmissing observations.

b. In analysis on labor market entry, occupational status and supervising refer to the last job.

c. Average of the months in which respondent has a partner (No. of respondents: female entry, 1,766; male entry, 863; female exit, 2,366; male exit, 2,395).

d. Average of the months in which respondent has a working partner (No. of respondents: female entry, 1,500; male entry, 540; female exit, 2,045; male exit, 2,054).

Results

Before we consider the impact of partner's resources on changes in labor market participation, we first pay attention to the impact of having a partner. Tables 3 and 4 show the results of relationship status for women and men, respectively. Married women are clearly less likely to extend their labor market participation, that is, to enter the labor market or to increase their weekly number of working hours, than single women. At the same time, labor market exit and reduction of working hours are much more common among married women, followed by unmarried cohabiting women, than among noncohabiting and single women. The differences are substantial: Compared to single women, married women are almost half as likely to enter the labor market and to increase their working hours, about 4.5 times as likely to leave the labor market, and almost 3 times as likely to reduce their working hours. This pattern perfectly corroborates the role theory that emphasizes women's caring role if they have a family. Adjustments in male labor market participation partly depend on relational status as well, but to a much lesser extent than women's. Exit chances are lowest for married men, but also (non)cohabiting men are less likely to leave the labor market than single men. This result is in line with male role expectations: Men who are responsible for a family show stronger labor market attachment.

The models in Tables 3 and 4, which are only based on respondents with a partner, reveal to what extent adjustments in labor market participation of women and men depend on the resources of the partner. If people make such decisions on economic grounds, there should be a negative relationship between partner's education, occupational status, and employment on one hand and increases in labor market participation on the other hand, and a positive relationship between partner's resources and decreases of labor market participation. Overall, we have to conclude that such a relationship is not found, and that our results do not support the economic hypothesis. Among many nonsignificant effects, we find only two exceptions: Women with highly educated husbands are more likely to reduce working hours ($b = 0.049$; $\exp(b) = 1.05$), and reducing working hours is more likely for women who have an employed husband (b for partner no job = -0.520). Furthermore, there are some indications of opposite partner effects. This means that a resourceful spouse does not restrict the other spouse's labor market participation but enhances it. We find, for example, that a woman whose husband has a high occupational status is less likely to leave the labor force ($b = -0.005$). One could argue that a successful husband might allow the family to pay for child care, which enables the wife to uphold her labor market participation.

Table 3. Influence of Relationship Status and Partners' Resources on Females' Probability of Labor Market Entry and Exit and Transitions Into More and Fewer Hours (Discrete-Time Event History Models)

Females	Entry						Exit						More hours						Fewer hours					
	All respondents			All			All respondents			All respondents			All respondents			All respondents			All respondents			All respondents		
	With partner			With partner			With partner			With partner			With partner			With partner			With partner			With partner		
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Intercept	-5.346**	0.208	-6.234**	0.314	-4.975**	0.187	-3.412**	0.258	-3.600**	0.339	-4.461**	0.513	-10.064**	0.300	-8.656**	0.394								
Year 1940-1959	-0.122	0.248	-0.515	0.359	-0.006	0.123	0.108	0.132	-0.907	0.617	-14.048	495.310	-0.311	0.326	-0.221	0.375								
Year 1960-1969	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0									
Year 1970-1979	0.366**	0.133	0.426**	0.147	-0.450**	0.080	-0.570**	0.083	-0.026	0.260	-0.123	0.297	0.325	0.179	0.326	0.194								
Year 1980-1989	0.448**	0.129	0.509**	0.145	-0.878**	0.082	-1.038**	0.086	0.306	0.234	0.231	0.270	0.841**	0.166	0.765**	0.183								
Year 1990-2003	0.894**	0.126	0.986**	0.142	-0.931**	0.083	-1.091**	0.087	0.471*	0.231	0.378	0.267	1.183**	0.165	1.098**	0.182								
Duration																								
< 2 years	0		0		0		0		0		0		0		0									
Duration																								
2-4 years	-0.557**	0.091	-0.498**	0.101	-0.046	0.090	0.067	0.096	-0.236	0.129	-0.151	0.143	-0.037	0.112	0.006	0.120								
Duration																								
5-9 years	-0.837**	0.081	-0.751**	0.088	0.128	0.095	0.188	0.102	-0.181	0.136	-0.091	0.149	0.037	0.117	0.039	0.124								
Duration																								
≥ 10 years	-1.792**	0.102	-1.666**	0.110	0.089	0.143	0.165	0.150	-0.225	0.201	-0.132	0.214	0.154	0.168	0.176	0.177								

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

	Entry				Exit				More hours				Fewer hours			
	All respondents		With partner		All respondents		With partner		All respondents		With partner		All respondents		With partner	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Females																
No. of previous events	0.110*	0.046	0.106*	0.049	0.268**	0.054	0.259**	0.057	0.181	0.104	0.241*	0.111	0.129	0.080	0.069	0.084
Human capital																
Education	0.082**	0.011	0.090**	0.013	-0.051**	0.009	-0.056**	0.011	0.042*	0.018	0.065**	0.021	0.052**	0.014	0.029	0.015
Occupational status ^a	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.002	-0.005**	0.002	-0.005**	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.012**	0.002	-0.014**	0.002
Work experience	-0.006	0.017	-0.009	0.018	-0.079**	0.017	-0.075**	0.018	-0.103**	0.024	-0.112**	0.026	-0.040	0.022	-0.038	0.023
Work experience square	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002**	0.001	0.002**	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
Supervising ^a	0.084	0.095	0.060	0.101	-0.277**	0.071	-0.276**	0.075	-0.158	0.142	-0.145	0.156	-0.345**	0.089	-0.345**	0.094
Working hours ^b	n.a.		n.a.	0.022**	0.002	0.024**	0.003	-0.097**	0.004	-0.099**	0.005	0.081**	0.004	0.084**	0.004	
Religiosity	-0.155*	0.061	-0.130*	0.066	0.055	0.051	0.110*	0.054	-0.083	0.089	-0.096	0.099	0.000	0.068	0.016	0.073

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

Females	Entry						Exit						More hours						Fewer hours					
	All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner		
	b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE	
Children																								
No children	0			0			0			0			0			0			0			0		
Youngest child < 4 years old	-0.771**	0.091		-0.710**	0.098		0.263**	0.066		0.258**	0.068		-1.046**	0.172		-1.068**	0.182		0.724**	0.089		0.757**	0.091	
Youngest child ≥ 4 years old	0.224*	0.095		0.257*	0.106		-0.923**	0.094		-0.917**	0.098		-0.315*	0.145		-0.268	0.154		-0.564**	0.134		-0.548**	0.140	
Empty nest	-0.541**	0.171		-0.603**	0.193		-0.342*	0.151		-0.402*	0.166		-1.056**	0.296		-1.058**	0.321		-0.800**	0.268		-0.891**	0.297	
Relationship status																								
Single	0			n.a.			0			n.a.			0			n.a.			0			n.a.		
Noncohabiting relationship	0.244	0.125		0.897**	0.120		0.101	0.106		-1.520**	0.086		0.115	0.155		0.710**	0.159		0.263	0.141		-0.798**	0.115	
Unmarried cohabitation	-0.088	0.125		0.571**	0.118		0.749**	0.117		-0.798**	0.091		0.029	0.151		0.599**	0.145		0.756**	0.134		-0.273**	0.098	
Marriage	-0.563**	0.098		0			1.486**	0.092		0			-0.528**	0.144		0			1.018**	0.123		0		
Partner's resources																								
Partner's education				0.016	0.012					0.008	0.010					-0.025			0.018			0.049**	0.014	
Partner no job				-0.225	0.213					0.119	0.185					0.112			0.320			-0.520*	0.239	

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

	Entry						Exit						More hours						Fewer hours					
	All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner		
	b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE	
Females																								
Partner's occupational status																								
Partner's working hours																								
No. of respondents	1,890			1,766			2,519			2,366			1,637			1,561			2,492			2,342		
No. of respondents- months	324,869			302,838			381,042			324,099			364,847			310,088			358,358			303,085		
No. of events	1,241			1,076			1,845			1,685			560			467			987			896		

Source: Family Survey of the Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

a. In the analysis on labor market entry, occupational status and supervising authority refer to the last job.

b. In the analysis on labor market entry, working hours are not included.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 4. Influence of Relationship Status and Partner's Resources on Males' Probability of Labor Market Entry and Exit and Transitions Into More and Fewer Hours (Discrete-Time Event History Models)

Males	Entry						Exit						More hours						Fewer hours					
	All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner		
	b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE		b	SE	
Intercept	-3.243**	0.213		-3.372**	0.427		-4.828**	0.327		-5.836**	0.510		-2.496**	0.323		-2.502**	0.503		-1.937**	0.353		-1.603**	0.497	
Year 1940-1959	-0.079	0.160		-0.219	0.232		0.131	0.196		0	0		0.149	0.227		-0.104	0.282		-0.412*	0.208		-0.497	0.269	
Year 1960-1969	0			0			0			0			0			0			0			0		
Year 1970-1979	0.024	0.141		-0.005	0.189		0.073	0.155		0.128	0.204		-0.392*	0.169		-0.586**	0.182		-0.249	0.149		-0.304	0.165	
Year 1980-1989	0.054	0.127		0.112	0.178		0.366**	0.142		0.556**	0.190		-0.319*	0.156		-0.511**	0.171		-0.109	0.142		-0.252	0.162	
Year 1990-2003	0.127	0.131		0.121	0.183		0.262	0.145		0.463*	0.195		-0.238	0.151		-0.377*	0.169		0.060	0.136		-0.137	0.161	
Duration																								
< 2 years	0			0			0			0			0			0			0			0		
Duration																								
2-4 years	-0.414**	0.090		-0.431**	0.113		-0.553**	0.123		-0.758**	0.164		-0.181	0.132		-0.259	0.149		0.082	0.162		-0.030	0.192	
Duration																								
5-9 years	-1.694**	0.125		-1.854**	0.155		-1.019**	0.148		-1.129**	0.172		-0.716**	0.150		-0.917**	0.162		-0.061	0.166		-0.166	0.187	
Duration																								
≥ 10 years	-3.506**	0.272		-3.666**	0.328		-1.642**	0.235		-1.782**	0.257		-0.965**	0.215		-1.117**	0.222		-0.454*	0.232		-0.503*	0.251	

(continued)

Table 4. (continued)

	Entry						Exit						More hours						Fewer hours					
	All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner		
	b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se	
Males																								
No. of previous events	0.136	0.080		0.128	0.094		0.124	0.084		0.078	0.097		0.377**	0.103		0.390**	0.110		0.327**	0.103		0.322**	0.108	
Human capital																								
Education	0.011	0.013		0.018	0.017		-0.018	0.015		-0.027	0.018		0.030	0.017		0.034	0.020		0.060**	0.016		0.044*	0.019	
Occupational status ^a	0.000	0.003		0.002	0.004		-0.012**	0.003		-0.013**	0.004		-0.013**	0.003		-0.012**	0.004		-0.012**	0.003		-0.012**	0.004	
Work experience	-0.027	0.019		-0.010	0.023		-0.081**	0.025		-0.064*	0.027		-0.011	0.027		0.005	0.029		-0.015	0.027		-0.018	0.029	
Work experience square	0.000	0.001		-0.001	0.001		0.003**	0.001		0.002**	0.001		-0.001	0.001		-0.002	0.001		-0.001	0.001		0.000	0.001	
Supervising ^a	0.076	0.119		0.003	0.141		-0.398**	0.094		-0.299**	0.105		-0.264*	0.105		-0.276*	0.112		-0.530**	0.099		-0.418**	0.107	
Working hours ^b	n.a.			n.a.			0.010	0.005		0.012*	0.006		-0.081**	0.004		-0.082**	0.005		0.125**	0.005		0.125**	0.005	
Religiosity	-0.094	0.075		-0.068	0.094		0.004	0.080		-0.075	0.095		-0.154	0.091		-0.140	0.102		-0.275**	0.091		-0.185	0.102	

(continued)

Table 4. (continued)

	Entry						Exit						More hours						Fewer hours					
	All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner			All respondents			With partner		
	b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se	
Males																								
Children																								
No children	0			0			0			0			0			0			0			0		
Youngest child < 4 years old	-0.311*	0.147		-0.358*	0.161		0.105	0.143		0.072	0.157		-0.084	0.139		-0.098	0.151		-0.102	0.138		-0.145	0.149	
Youngest child ≥ 4 years old	-0.569**	0.179		-0.623**	0.193		0.182	0.164		0.065	0.184		0.099	0.175		0.078	0.186		0.020	0.167		-0.024	0.183	
Empty nest	-0.757**	0.278		-0.882**	0.311		0.203	0.233		-0.001	0.266		-0.904	0.532		-0.868	0.539		0.171	0.308		0.125	0.340	
Relationship status																								
Single	0			n.a.			0			n.a.			0			n.a.			0			n.a.		
Noncohabiting relationship	0.346**	0.090		0.168			-0.333**	0.111		0.382**	0.148		0.353*	0.141		0.044	0.147		-0.005	0.142		-0.025	0.153	
Unmarried	0.269*	0.130		0.138			-0.418**	0.149		0.261	0.165		0.282	0.167		-0.032	0.162		-0.052	0.180		0.042	0.173	
Cohabitation																								
Marriage	0.105	0.127		0			-0.689**	0.131		0			0.276	0.153		0			-0.070	0.148		n.a.		
Partner's resources																								
Partner's education				0.000			0.019			0.014	0.019			-0.010		0.020					0.024	0.020		
Partner no job				0.105			0.258			0.697**	0.233			0.410		0.240					0.001	0.221		

(continued)

Table 4. (continued)

	Entry			Exit			More hours			Fewer hours				
	All respondents			All respondents			All respondents			All respondents				
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se		
Males														
Partner's occupational status			-0.002	0.004			-0.007	0.005			0.003	0.005	-0.007	0.005
Partner's working hours			0.007	0.007			0.010	0.006			0.012	0.007	0.002	0.006
No. of respondents	1,113		863		2,542		2,395		351		290		2,534	2,391
No. of respondent-months	90,273		71,319		634,253		556,966		564,250		495,963		627,726	551,637
No. of events	836		559		730		523		552		457		564	461

Source: Family Survey of the Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

a. In the analysis on labor market entry, occupational status and supervising authority refer to the last job.

b. In the analysis on labor market entry, working hours are not included.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

However, a Dutch study on female employment and child care shows that female employment in the Netherlands does not depend on the costs of child care (Ooms, Eggink, & Van Gameren, 2007). Moreover, the costs for child care in the Netherlands are regressive, which implies that higher earners pay more for formal child care facilities. Another indication of supportive partner effects results from the observation that partners' employment status or working hours affect the likelihood of a reduction of labor market participation. Women are less likely to reduce working hours if their husbands work many hours ($b = -0.014$), and men with nonemployed wives are more likely to leave the labor market ($b = 0.697$), or in other words, having an employed wife prevents men from becoming nonemployed.³ The conclusion does not alter when we measure the effect of the partner's resources as a difference score between a partner's and respondent's education and occupational status (models not shown). We observe one significant partner effect only: A woman is more likely to reduce working hours if her husband is higher educated than she is. We have to conclude that neither way of measuring partner effects leads to clear support for the economic hypothesis.

A brief look at other interesting results from our analysis shows that individual human capital enhances labor market participation of women and restrains them from lowering their working hours (except for the positive effect of female education on the odds of reducing working hours), whereas for men results are mixed: Men with a high occupational status are less likely to exit the labor market or to reduce working hours, but also less likely to increase them. Education stimulates a reduction in male working hours. Furthermore, women are found to be more likely to stop working and are less likely to become employed if they (and/or their partner) are religious. Finally, the presence of young children has a strong positive effect on labor market exit and reduction of working hours of women, whereas it negatively affects women's labor market entry and increase of working hours. When children are at a school-going age, it is the other way around: Women are more likely to increase their labor market participation and less likely to reduce it. Children hardly affect male decisions with respect to labor market participation, except for the finding that men are less likely to become employed when they have children.

Although we find no strong support for the economic mechanism so far, we think it is too early to reject it completely. We suggested that the restrictive effect of partners' resources might very well be present only in certain situations. To test these hypotheses, we include interaction terms between partner's resources on one hand, and historical period, human capital, and children on the other hand. The results are displayed in Table 5 for women

and in Table 6 for men. The upper panel considers the historical perspective. We had expected that the economic mechanism was mainly important for women in earlier decades. Evidence is not very convincing; we only find that the negative relationship between husbands' employment status and women's odds of becoming nonemployed in earlier decades has turned positive in recent decades (from -0.700 to $-0.700 + 4.7 \times 0.226 = 0.362$). The hypothesis that men would experience more restriction from their partners' resources nowadays than they did in the past needs to be rejected completely. It is surprising that despite the major societal changes with respect to attitudes toward division of labor, the way spouses affect each other has not changed that much. The neglect of a historical perspective in most earlier research does not seem to be the reason for the inconclusiveness of the findings.

A second condition we study is individual human capital, and we had expected that decisions concerning labor market participation of people with a lot of human capital are less influenced by their partners' resources, and that the economic mechanisms will mainly apply to people with little human capital. In general, support is very meager again. There are hardly any significant interaction terms in the second panel of Tables 5 and 6. There is one indication that women with much human capital make labor market participation decisions more independently from their spouses' resources than their counterparts with little human capital: Husbands' education increases the odds of reducing the working hours of poorly educated women ($b = 0.176$) but has no impact on the odds for highly educated women ($b = 0.176 - 14 \times 0.010 = 0.036$). However, it usually seems that partners' resources enhance instead of restrict labor market participation of people with little human capital, which contradicts our hypothesis. For example, a highly educated wife increases the odds of entering and decreases the odds of leaving the labor force of a poorly educated man, but wives' education does not affect the same odds of highly educated men. And also, husbands' education stimulates the increase of working hours for women with a low occupational status, but not for women with a high occupational status.

Finally, we test whether the economic mechanism holds up under the condition that the couple has children. Childbirth often requires more time investments in the household at the expense of time investments on the labor market. It seems likely that this is the moment for couples to base working hours adjustments on economic considerations. This hypothesis finds partial support (see lowest panel in Tables 5 and 6). Childless women's decisions to leave the labor force or to reduce working hours are independent of their husbands' educational achievement, but mothers are more likely to leave the labor force or to reduce working hours if they have highly educated

Table 5. Influence of the Spouse by Individual Human Capital, Children, and Year on Females' Probability of Labor Market Entry or Exit and the Transition Into More or Fewer Hours^a

Females	Entry		Exit		More hours		Fewer hours	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Partner's Resources \times Year								
Partner's Education \times Year (0-4.7)	0.033	0.034	0.041*	0.020	-0.061	0.065	0.061	0.044
Partner No Job \times Year (0-4.7)	-0.005	0.009	-0.011	0.006	0.009	0.016	-0.003	0.011
Partner's Occupational Status \times Year (0-4.7)	0.235	0.409	-0.700**	0.276	0.732	0.658	-0.733	0.473
Partner's Occupational Status \times Year (0-4.7)	-0.118	0.091	0.226**	0.057	-0.154	0.144	0.054	0.101
Partner's Occupational Status \times Year (0-4.7)	-0.005	0.008	-0.001	0.005	0.005	0.016	0.015	0.010
Partner's Working Hours \times Year (0-4.7)	0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.004	-0.005	0.002
	-0.014	0.008	0.010	0.005	0.002	0.015	-0.010	0.010
	0.004	0.002	-0.003*	0.001	0.000	0.003	-0.001	0.002
Partner's Resources \times Human Capital								
Partner's Education \times Education	0.058	0.038	0.047	0.032	0.048	0.070	0.176**	0.055
Partner's Education \times Occupational Status ^b	-0.004	0.003	-0.003	0.003	-0.006	0.005	-0.010*	0.004
Partner No Job \times Education	0.060	0.034	0.002	0.027	0.102*	0.049	0.032	0.037
Partner No Job \times Occupational Status ^b	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.003**	0.001	0.000	0.001
Partner No Job \times Education	-0.406	0.430	-0.404	0.340	0.260	0.702	-0.049	0.507
Partner No Job \times Occupational Status ^b	0.015	0.031	0.042	0.024	-0.011	0.048	-0.038	0.035
Partner's Occupational Status \times Education	-0.139	0.391	0.042	0.297	0.649	0.499	-0.136	0.387
Partner's Occupational Status \times Education	-0.002	0.007	0.002	0.005	-0.011	0.008	-0.008	0.006
Partner's Occupational Status \times Education	0.002	0.009	-0.002	0.008	0.014	0.016	0.008	0.012
Partner's Occupational Status \times Education	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
Partner's Occupational Status \times Education	0.009	0.008	-0.003	0.006	0.027*	0.011	-0.002	0.008

(continued)

Table 5. (continued)

Females	Entry		Exit		More hours		Fewer hours	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
× Occupational Status ^b	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partner's Working Hours	0.000	0.009	0.004	0.007	-0.010	0.016	-0.032**	0.011
× Education	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Partner's Working Hours	-0.002	0.008	0.005	0.006	-0.012	0.012	-0.027**	0.009
× Occupational Status ^b	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partner's Resources × Child Situation								
Partner's Education	0.069**	0.021	-0.012	0.012	-0.021	0.024	0.034	0.017
× No Child (ref)								
× Child < 4 years old	-0.070*	0.027	0.052**	0.019	-0.035	0.051	0.057*	0.026
× Child ≥ 4 years old	-0.069**	0.025	0.058*	0.024	-0.006	0.033	-0.012	0.038
× Empty nest	-0.067	0.053	0.010	0.042	0.046	0.088	0.081	0.085
Partner No Job	-0.204	0.247	0.010	0.196	-0.006	0.339	-0.609*	0.250
× No Child (ref)								
× Child < 4 years old	0.400	0.240	0.109	0.187	0.031	0.510	0.245	0.247
× Child ≥ 4 years old	-0.331	0.244	0.176	0.255	0.382	0.322	-0.065	0.420
× Empty Nest	-0.282	0.450	0.649*	0.318	0.816	0.703	1.052	0.603
Partner's Occupational Status	0.011*	0.004	-0.004	0.003	0.009	0.005	-0.004	0.004
× No Child (ref)								
× Child < 4 years old	-0.017**	0.006	-0.001	0.004	-0.016	0.012	-0.003	0.006
× Child ≥ 4 years old	-0.015**	0.005	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.007	0.018*	0.009
× Empty Nest	-0.007	0.012	-0.003	0.011	-0.020	0.022	0.008	0.019
Partner's Working Hours	-0.001	0.006	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.008	-0.010	0.006

(continued)

Table 5. (continued)

	Entry		Exit		More hours		Fewer hours	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Females								
× No Child (ref)								
× Child < 4 years old	-0.010	0.005	-0.008*	0.004	0.010	0.012	-0.009	0.005
× Child ≥ 4 years old	0.004	0.005	-0.010	0.005	-0.009	0.007	-0.005	0.008
× Empty Nest	0.006	0.01	-0.017*	0.007	-0.022	0.015	-0.026	0.014

Source: Family Survey of the Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003.

a. Each interaction term has been added separately to the baseline model; interactions with having a partner are based on the sample of months with all respondents; interactions with partner's resources are based on the sample of months in which respondents have a partner.

b. In the analysis on labor market entry, occupational status refers to last job.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 6. Influence of the Spouse by Individual Human Capital, Children, and Year on Males' Probability of Labor Market Entry or Exit and the Transition Into More or Fewer Hours^a

Males	Entry		Exit		More hours		Fewer hours	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Partner's Resources × Year								
Partner's Education × Year (0-4.7)	-0.024	0.045	-0.018	0.051	0.022	0.047	-0.049	0.046
Partner No Job × Year (0-4.7)	0.007	0.012	0.009	0.014	-0.010	0.013	0.023	0.013
Partner's Occupational Status × Year (0-4.7)	0.160	0.396	0.090	0.416	0.523	0.397	0.087	0.373
Partner's Occupational Status × Year (0-4.7)	-0.014	0.074	0.140	0.082	-0.031	0.080	-0.027	0.078
Partner's Occupational Status × Year (0-4.7)	0.007	0.010	-0.003	0.014	0.015	0.013	-0.017	0.012
Partner's Working Hours × Year (0-4.7)	-0.003	0.003	-0.001	0.004	-0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Partner's Working Hours × Year (0-4.7)	0.009	0.009	0.021*	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.000	0.008
Partner's Working Hours × Year (0-4.7)	-0.001	0.002	-0.004	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002
Partner's Resources × Human Capital								
Partner's Education × Education	0.159**	0.060	-0.120*	0.051	-0.044	0.062	-0.020	0.057
Partner's Education × Occupational Status ^b	-0.013**	0.005	0.011**	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.004
Partner's Education × Occupational Status ^b	0.025	0.053	-0.001	0.049	-0.013	0.054	-0.069	0.051
Partner No Job × Education	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.001
Partner No Job × Occupational Status ^b	0.451	0.430	0.756	0.414	0.006	0.480	-0.164	0.437
Partner No Job × Occupational Status ^b	-0.029	0.029	-0.005	0.030	0.030	0.032	0.013	0.031
Partner's Occupational Status × Education	0.538	0.414	0.855*	0.383	-0.088	0.408	0.201	0.386
Partner's Occupational Status × Education	-0.010	0.007	-0.004	0.007	0.010	0.007	-0.004	0.006
Partner's Occupational Status × Occupational Status ^b	0.015	0.017	-0.002	0.017	-0.020	0.017	-0.024	0.017
Partner's Occupational Status × Occupational Status ^b	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
Partner's Occupational Status × Occupational Status ^b	0.015	0.015	0.010	0.015	0.010	0.015	-0.002	0.014
Partner's Occupational Status × Occupational Status ^b	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

(continued)

Table 6. (continued)

Males	Entry		Exit		More hours		Fewer hours	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Partner's Working Hours	-0.005	0.011	0.008	0.011	0.015	0.012	0.005	0.011
× Education	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
Partner's Working Hours	-0.003	0.011	0.007	0.010	0.023*	0.010	0.002	0.009
× Occupational Status ^b	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partner's Resources × Child Situation								
Partner's Education	-0.015	0.022	0.029	0.026	0.037	0.027	0.003	0.028
× No Child (ref)								
× Child < 4 years old	0.064	0.040	0.019	0.041	-0.096*	0.039	0.067	0.039
× Child ≥ 4 years old	0.074	0.049	-0.059	0.040	-0.086*	0.042	0.023	0.042
× Empty Nest	-0.167	0.093	-0.036	0.067	-0.129	0.151	-0.089	0.097
Partner No Job	-0.067	0.287	0.795**	0.293	0.540	0.303	-0.059	0.285
× No Child (ref)								
× Child < 4 years old	0.213	0.296	-0.167	0.275	-0.016	0.272	-0.083	0.262
× Child ≥ 4 years old	0.365	0.311	-0.195	0.244	-0.210	0.278	0.162	0.268
× Empty Nest	0.365	0.712	0.448	0.469	0.260	1.017	0.304	0.568
Partner's Occupational Status	-0.004	0.005	-0.010	0.006	0.002	0.006	-0.008	0.006
× No Child (ref)								
× Child < 4 years old	-0.005	0.014	0.009	0.014	-0.001	0.012	-0.002	0.012
× Child ≥ 4 years old	0.024	0.013	0.003	0.011	0.007	0.012	0.007	0.011
× Empty Nest	0.011	0.044	0.034	0.023	0.072	0.047	-0.023	0.026

(continued)

Table 6. (continued)

Males	Entry		Exit		More hours		Fewer hours	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Partner's Working Hours	0.008	0.007	0.009	0.007	0.011	0.007	0.003	0.006
× No Child (ref)								
× Child < 4 years old	-0.009	0.008	0.003	0.008	0.004	0.008	-0.007	0.007
× Child ≥ 4 years old	-0.004	0.009	0.006	0.007	0.002	0.009	0.001	0.007
× Empty Nest	-0.006	0.018	-0.005	0.013	-0.049	0.039	-0.027	0.019

Source: Family Survey of the Dutch Population 1998, 2000, 2003.

a. Each interaction term has been added separately to the baseline model; interactions with having a partner are based on the sample of months with all respondents; interactions with partner's resources are based on the sample of months in which respondents have a partner;

b. In the analysis on labor market entry, occupational status refers to last job.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

husbands. Not exactly the same, but in the same direction, are the effects on women's probability to enter the labor market: Whereas childless women can benefit from their husbands' education and occupational status, mothers find no support from their husbands' resources. Although these results do not indicate that mothers' entry chances are restricted by the resources of their husbands, they do show that mothers benefit less from their partners' resources than childless women. Men appear to be less likely to increase their working hours as their partners' educational achievement increases, but only if they have children, which supports our hypothesis too. However, we would like to note that many of the interaction effects are nonsignificant, and that the restrictive partner effect for couples with children is predominantly found for women. We will come back to the latter in the next section.

Conclusion

In this study, we extensively tested the economic hypothesis in the case of the Netherlands. We did this by examining the impact of partner's labor market resources on adjustments in labor market participation of men and women. We estimated the effects of partner's educational level, employment status, occupational status, and working hours on transitions into and out of employment, and on changes in the number of weekly working hours. We set out to solve the inconclusiveness of earlier findings, and tested the influence of the partner's resources under several conditions: historical period, level of human capital, and presence and age of children. The general conclusion is that labor market participation is not restricted by partner's resources, even not under specific conditions. It is clear that this result refutes the economic hypothesis. Apparently, men with highly educated wives are as likely to work a day a week less than men with poorly educated wives, and women with high-status husbands are as likely to enter the labor market as women with low-status husbands. We did not solve the inconclusiveness of earlier findings, but our results lead us to believe that at least as far as the Netherlands is concerned, the division of paid work within households is not dependent on economic factors. Particularly, we want to stress that although there is a strong variety in the number of working hours of women in the Netherlands, adjustments in these working hours are not affected by the husband's human capital at all.

We think that cultural factors (general norms and individual values or attitudes) are more important. It is not the results on the influence of the partner's human capital that bring us to this conclusion but several other interesting patterns in our results. First, the results in this study show that the patterns in

the division of labor market participation is in concordance with traditional gender roles: Married (or cohabiting) women are more likely to reduce work time and less likely to increase it, whereas the presence of a partner makes men slightly more attached to the labor market. Furthermore, young children clearly hinder female labor market participation, whereas mothers with school-age children are more likely to enter the labor market than childless women, which is all in concordance with the role-specialization hypothesis.

A second indication of gender role behavior shows from the findings concerning the interaction effects between partner's resources and the presence and age of children. Our conclusion that there is a stronger negative relationship between resources of the partner and labor market participation when children are present mainly referred to women: Whereas the impact of partner's resources is the same for men with or without children, for women with children, labor market participation is more restricted by their husbands' resources than for women without children. The fact that children make a difference in the decision structure of women but not in that of men can be considered to support the idea of gender role behavior as well: Women's labor market behavior is more receptive to partner effects than male labor market behavior, possibly because of the difference between the male labor role and the female labor and caring role.

Finally, the results on religiosity show that women are more likely to leave the labor market and less likely to become employed if the couple (at least one of the two spouses) is religious. In the Netherlands, religiosity is an important proxy for traditional values with regard to women's labor market participation and the gender-specific division of labor, and our findings show that personal values and attitudes influence labor market participation decisions, at least as far as women are concerned.

If we conclude that cultural factors seem more important than economic factors when it comes to couples' division of labor market participation, a paradox arises: the Netherlands is usually characterized as a country with progressive values and attitudes concerning female labor market participation and division of labor, but with relatively traditional behavior on these issues (Kalmijn & Luijkx, 2006; Treas & Widmer, 2000). Hakim (2000, 2002) claims that personal preferences are the most important determinants of decisions. We believe that this claim helps us to understand the paradox. In this respect, it is important to note that values and attitudes are general (e.g., all women should be allowed to work; there is nothing against it when mothers work; fathers are as capable as mothers to raise children), whereas preferences are individual and refer to the personal context (e.g., in my case I would rather stay at home—regardless of my attitudes on working in general). Although values and preferences are correlated, we think that traditional

labor market outcomes in the Netherlands might be the result of relatively traditional preferences despite relatively progressive values in general. Dutch women (and men) generally believe that women should be free to be active on the labor market, also if they have children; however, women prefer to lower their own labor market participation if they have children, and men do not. We are strengthened in this belief by findings about actual and preferred working time by Dutch men and women which show that a large majority of the Dutch couples are happy with their current (on average low) working hours (Portegijs, Hermans, & Lalta, 2006). We encourage future research to test the strength of these alternative cultural mechanisms versus the economic mechanism—not only in the Netherlands but in other countries as well to understand its true merits. In the introduction, we claimed that investigating the case of the Netherlands would increase the chance of finding support for the economic hypothesis because economic grounds are likely to be decisive when there is a large variety in (accepted) working hours choices. But perhaps the economic mechanism is more likely to show up in countries like the United States where couples are more tied to market realities. In such countries, economic mechanisms might prevail over cultural mechanisms because acting nonrationally has strong and negative consequences for the couple's financial position.

We like to emphasize that in testing and falsifying the economic hypothesis, we focused on the economic mechanism within households, especially whether resources of one spouse are negatively related to labor market participation of the other spouse. This might be the case either because financial incentives to work are low or because the household can afford to work less. The relationship between individual human capital and labor market participation is often assumed to rely on economic mechanisms too. However, the direction of this effect is not obvious. On one hand, people with high levels of human capital have a high earning capacity and therefore have financial incentives to work more hours, but on the other hand, such a high earning capacity makes it financially more easily affordable to work less. In our opinion, it is therefore not clear what findings would corroborate economic mechanisms on the individual level, and thus, the right test is on the household level.

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Notes

1. Sensitivity tests in which the sample was restricted to younger respondents, to the 20 most recent years of respondents' labor market careers, and to respondents who are in their first relationship did not produce indications that recalling issues seriously or systematically distort the results.
2. Primary education = 6 years; lower vocational education and lower secondary education = 10 years; intermediate secondary education and abbreviated intermediate vocational education = 11 years; higher secondary education = 12 years; intermediate vocational education = 13 years; higher vocational education = 15 years; university = 17 years; postacademic education = 20 years.
3. Additional analyses have revealed that the economic hypothesis would not get more support if partner's education and partner's occupational status are included separately instead of together. Although the two effects are mostly nonsignificant, the effects go in different directions, so the one does not serve as an explanation for the other.

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